

A Numerical Study of the Nanking Incident

Part I

Akira Nakamura

The Nanking Incident or the Nanking massacre, as one might call it, took place in Nanking, the then capital of China, during the weeks after it was occupied by the Japanese army on December 13, 1937. As everyone knows, there has long been a heated controversy among historians, chiefly Japanese and Chinese, over the historical assessment of this event, the credibility of evidence, memory, records and death figures, the facticity of the entire massacre story and its moral and political implications, etc. etc., and yet, being more emotional and nationalistic than factual, the controversy has always been far from constructive or worthwhile. Chinese scholars and their Japanese supporters claim that more than 300,000 or even 400,000 Chinese civilians were killed by the Japanese troops systematically within the walled city, whereas Japanese revisionists, as they are often called, deny the massacre outright, saying it is nothing but a Chinese fabrication.

It is of course quite useless to discuss the truth or otherwise of the Nanking massacre without ascertaining first what actually happened there in the said period of time. The mass killing in Nanking being chiefly that of Chinese prisoners of war (POWs), we will see how this capital city fell into the hands of the Japanese army and how the Chinese POWs were treated by the Japanese: Were they murdered or released? And how many? With this in view, Japanese treatment of Chinese POWs will be checked up concerning major mopping-up sectors.

People often speak of '*Gyakusatsu*' (roughly massacre) committed by the Japanese army in Nanking, but this is a careless way of putting things, I'm afraid, and we must first define the word '*Gyakusatsu*' before we can use this word with confidence or, at least, tolerable accuracy. So some of the Japanese executions of Chinese POWs will be checked against the definitions thus obtained to see if they are to be categorized as '*Gyakusatsu*' or not.

I am no denier of the Nanking Incident nor do I want to play down or minimize what has been done in the past: I hope just that by discussing the matter numerically, the debate over the issue, now too much politicized, will become more factual and therefore rational, though I am not so optimistic nor naive as to envision a 'common historical understanding' being thereby shared by Japan and China.

I How prisoners were executed or released

1. CAPTURE OF NANKING

The Chinese ignore the Japanese Army's call for surrender and provoke an attack. The Japanese Army, as it neared Nanking, advised the Nanking garrison troops to surrender on December 9, and proposed that they open the fort in a peaceful manner, giving them 24-hour grace. However, the Chinese ignored this generous offer. Instead they provoked the Japanese by firing upon them or by moving their soldiers by ship, whereupon the Japanese army commenced attack on December 10.

Rout of Chinese soldiers. The Chinese army defending Nanking had long since got out of control, and from around the afternoon of December 12, it started crumbling. Then from the evening of that day, the Chinese soldiers (including a portion of civilians) began fleeing to Hsiakwan in order to cross the Yangtze and escape to the opposite bank. Some headed for the east via Mufu-shan area, north of the city; others fled upstream along the right bank of the Yangtze, both attempting to break through the encircling Japanese troops. Probably because they gave up the idea of escaping as an impossible adventure, an enormous number of soldiers stole into the International Safety Zone within the walls, and in the disguise of civilians (by changing their uniforms into plain clothes), they hid themselves there. It seems that no units ever got out of the south gate, as General T'ang instructed, and attempted to make their escape to Tuangte, Icheng, or Wuhu area, for getting out of the south gate and breaking through the siege by the Japanese Army outside the gate was considered impossible. Such rout of soldiers was to continue like a rapid stream from midnight of December 12 to early morning of December 13.

However, these retreating soldiers had no boats available for crossing the Yangtze. They could make neither for the east nor for the west by breaking through the besieging Japanese Army which was closing in on the city of Nanking.

As to what became of those remnants, various stories are told. Some were drowned, some were mowed down on the river by Japanese Naval gunfire. Others were annihilated in a fusillade while they were assembled at Hsiakwan. Still others were running away, when they encountered Japanese soldiers, were taken prisoners, and were either interned or released while some were executed. There were those soldiers who came through the siege and made good their escape. Cases are known of some soldiers who infiltrated the safety zone in the disguise of citizens and were detected and interned or executed, or others who succeeded in hiding by outwitting the Japanese Army. So we cannot discuss them in the same breath. If we do research on how the Japanese Army handled these remnants, we may get a real picture of what is called 'The Nanking Incident.'

Occupation of important points by several units. As we have seen in the previous section, with the Chinese Army crumbled, first-line units of the besieging Japanese Army captured the Nanking walls and entered the city in accordance with the guidelines for the capture of Nanking as had previously been instructed. The following is a description of how the Japanese Army captured and entered the city.¹⁾

Chungshan Men Gate. In the early morning of December 13, the 20th Infantry Regiment (formed at Fukuchiyama) of the 16th Division occupied the gate. Two battalions each of the 20th Regiment and the 9th Regiment (formed at Kyoto) entered the city by the demolished point of the wall near the Chungshan Men Gate.

Kuanghua Men Gate. On the early morning of December 13, the 36th Infantry Regiment (formed at Sabae) of the 9th Division, occupied this gate. In view of the decreased war potential of the same Regiment, the 19th Infantry Regiment (formed at Tsuruga) of the same Division advanced into the city ahead of the 36th Regiment.

Chunghua Men Gate. On the afternoon of December 12, the 47th Regiment (formed at Oita) of the 6th Division occupied the wall at the point west of the Chunghua Men Gate. At 01:00 on December 13, the 13th Regiment (formed at Kumamoto) of the same Division occupied the Chunghua Men Gate and after engineers cleared of sandbags piled up inside the gate, thus opening the fort, the 13th Regiment entered the city early in the morning.

Southwestern corner. On the afternoon of December 12, the 23rd Regiment (formed at Miyakonojo) of the 6th Division occupied this corner, advancing into the city on the following day.

From Chiangtung Men to Hsiakwan. The 45th Regiment (formed at Kagoshima) of the same division advanced northward between the west side of the walled city of Nanking and the Yangtze River, capturing Chiangtung Men on the night of December 12. In the early morning of December 13, the 45th Regiment encountered the 51st and the 58th Divisions of the retreating Chinese Army in a dense fog and smashed about 2,300 Chinese, advancing to Hsiakwan on the next day.

Puko. The Kunisaki branch unit with the 41st Regiment (formed at Fukuymama) as its skeleton crossed the Yangtze to the left bank (west side) at Tzuhu-chen, 40 kilometers south-west of Nanking on December 11. At midnight of December 13, it occupied Puko, the opposite bank of Hsiakwan, completely.

Hsiakwan. The Sasaki branch unit that composed of the 33rd Regiment (formed at Hisai) and the 38th Regiment (formed at Nara), advanced on the right side of the main

¹⁾ Nankin-Senshi [History of Nanking Campaign](Tokyo, Kaiko-sha, 1993)[hereafter cited as NS], ch.5.


force units of the 16th Division, stormed Hsiakwan on the afternoon of December 13, concentrating firing with heavy weapons on enemy remnants who were trying to cross the Yangtze and flee on small boats or rafts, thus mowing down more than 2,000 enemy soldiers. Japanese Navy ships that had sailed up the river also opened up fire on enemy remnants who were attempting to cross the Yangtze.

The above is an outline of how various important points of Nanking were captured by Japanese units. On December 13, Nanking was completely captured. We can see that the Chinese units that had failed to escape from the city by then were literally so many rats in a trap.

2. MOPPING-UP OPERATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FALL OF THE CITY

Treatment of remnants and prisoners. The Japanese Army that completely sieged and occupied the city of Nanking lost no time in mopping up remnants who were found in and around the walled city. It seems that how the Japanese Army handled remnants and prisoners, whom it rounded up at the time of mopping up, is what matters most in finding out what really happened or did not happen in Nanking. Therefore, we will look into the mopping-up operation sector by sector where it was carried out. By way of clarifying the explanation, the principal mopping sectors are indicated by A, A1,.. B, B1...C, D,...and J.

Main Mopping-up Sectors
Dec. 10~17, 1937



Sector A (Inside the walls. The area lying between the eastern wall and chungshan Road, bounded by the wall on the north and by Chungshan East Road on the south)

On December 13 and 14, the 9th and the 20th Regiments of the 16th Division did the mopping up. In this area there were few buildings where the remnants could hide. So they achieved almost nothing, except that on December 14, the 4th company of the 20th Regiment shot to death 328 remnants and buried them. On this occasion, they confiscated 80 rifles, 4,000 rifle bullets, 110 bayonets, 60 revolvers, 5,000 pistol bullets and 20 hand grenades.²⁾

According to the diary of Masuda Rokusuke, third squad leader of the 2nd platoon of the same company, the street inside the walls into which his squad advanced on 13th by the Chungshan Men Gate was littered with weapons, rounds of ammunition and uniforms which the remnants had thrown away, and the stores had been thoroughly looted by the Chinese Army. "Indeed the street we saw was completely deserted, where not a dog was to be found, let alone a human being," he writes. On the following day, December 14, his squad detected a large crowd of remnants taking off their uniforms and changing into plain clothes. He and his men shot to death nearly 600 of them near the Hsuanwu Men Gate according to his diary.³⁾

And in the diary of Corporal Hayashi Masaaki, who belonged to the 4th squad of the 1st platoon of the 3rd company, it is described that on December 14, men of the 4th squad rounded up in front of the Supreme Court remnants who were running away. "We rounded up dozens of remnants in the face of the enemy's fire coming from every direction and killed them," the diary goes.⁴⁾ This shows that even on December 14, the remnants in hiding fired at the Japanese soldiers and resisted stubbornly.

Sector A1 (Outside the walls. South of Tzuchin-shan Mountain, north of the main road leading from Tangshuichen to Chungshan Men Gate)

The 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment mopped up this sector on December 13 and 14. Hardly any remnant was spotted.⁵⁾

Sector A2 (Outside the walls. Machun)

On the morning of December 14, the 12th company of the 20th Infantry Regiment was ordered to reinforce the friendly unit in Machun. It rounded up 200~300 remnants who assaulted Transport corps, and with the aid of the 3rd machine-gun company of the 20th

²⁾ The 20th Infantry Regiment's 4th Company, Jinchu-nisshi [War Diary]No.5, Dec.1-31,1937, Nankin-Senshi Shiryo-shu [A Collection of Historical Documents on the Nanking Campaign](Tokyo, Kaiko-sha, 1993)[hereafter cited as NSS]vol.I, pp.504-505.

³⁾ Masuda Rokusuke Nikki [The Diary of Masuda Rokusuke], *ibid.*, pp.415-416.

⁴⁾ Hayashi Masaaki Nikki [The Diary of Hayashi Masaaki], *ibid.*, p.413.

⁵⁾ NS, p.168.

Regiment, it shot all of them dead.⁶⁾

Sector B (Inside the walls. The northeast area of the city, bounded by Chungshan North Road, Central Road and the northern wall)

On December 14, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 38th Regiment of the 16th Division took charge of this sector, but partly because some part of the sector had already been mopped up by a segment of the 20th Regiment, it is recorded in the detailed battle report of the 38th Regiment that nobody has achieved remarkable results in this mopping up operation.⁷⁾

Sector B1 (the Hsiakwan area outside the walls, and the area near the battery on the Shihtzu-shan Hill in the northwest of the city)

The 33rd Regiment of the 16th Division was assigned to the task of mopping up this sector. On the morning of December 13, the regiment that occupied the astronomical observatory (on the western ridge of Tzuchin-shan Mountain) and the Taiping Men Gate started for Hsiakwan at 09:30, determined to cut off the enemy's escape route. The regiment left the Taiping Men Gate and passed along the east side of Lake Hsuanwu and advanced via Heping Men Gate, while mopping up countless numbers of remnants who were hiding in the villages on both sides of the road. They arrived at Hsiakwan at 2:30. On the Yangtze river, a host of remnants were heading for the opposite bank by making use of motor-powered sailing boats, rowboats, rafts and other floating objects. The regiment, deployed on the side of the river, fired fiercely at them for two hours. It was estimated that the enemy soldiers that were mowed down numbered no less than 2,000.⁸⁾

Starting on the following day, the 14th, the same regiment mopped up the neighborhood of the Shihtzu-shan Hill and the Hsiakwan area.

A great majority of Chinese soldiers had fled, but still a considerable number of remnants were in hiding. About 200 Chinese soldiers who had entrenched themselves in the battery on the Shihtzu-shan Hill and resisted stubbornly surrendered at last, abandoning their weapons, but it seems they were executed.⁹⁾ It is stated in the detailed battle report of the 33rd Infantry Regiment that from December 10 to 14, the abandoned enemy corpses numbered 6,830, of which, those abandoned on December 13

⁶⁾ Ibid., p.333. See also Makihara Nobuo Nikki [The Diary of Makihara Nobuo], NSS vol.I, p.405.

⁷⁾ The 38th Infantry Regiment, Sento-shoho [Battle Report]No.12, Dec.14,1937, NSS vol.I, p.489.

⁸⁾ The 33rd Infantry Regiment, Nankin-fukin Sento-shoho [Battle Report in the Vicinity of Nanking], *ibid.*, p.495.

⁹⁾ NS, p.322.

totalled 5,500, including corpses of executed remnants. The report says that the enemy soldiers captured during the same period were 14 officers, 3,082 non-commissioned officers and privates, totaling 3,096, and it says, "The prisoners were executed."

Sector B2 (Outside the walls. The Taiping Men Gate)

On the morning of December 13, the 33rd Infantry Regiment that captured the western side of the Tzuchin-shan Mountain and the Taiping Men Gate, committed the 6th company to the task of defending the Taiping Men Gate, and the main force of the regiment headed for Hsiakwan (aforementioned).

It is recorded that the 6th company that defended the Taiping Men Gate executed over 1,000 enemy soldiers on the same day. However, it is not known whether they were remnants, or surrenderers or prisoners, and again, as regards the circumstances of the execution and the exact number of the executed enemy soldiers, much is not known.¹⁰⁾

According to the reminiscence of a Japanese veteran who participated in the said execution, "there was a large Chinese unit that signaled the wish to surrender by putting up a white flag, while there was another unit of 300 soldiers who showed resistance, though it put up a white flag. We smashed in a determined manner the Chinese unit that offered resistance."¹¹⁾

Sector B3 (Outsid the walls. Hsienhemchen, and Hsiaohuamen).

On the afternoon of December 13, the 2nd Heavy Siege Gun Battalion of the 16th Division deployed near Hsienhemchen, about 9 kilometers northeast of the Chungshan Men Gate, was attacked by a large enemy force that had escaped from Nanking. On the morning of December 14, the Chinese troops came back for the second charge, but they were repulsed. In the afternoon of the same day, the enemy surrendered, holding a white flag. Thereupon, the 10th company of the 38th Regiment that was on guard, and the 9th company of the 20th Regiment that had come to aid disarmed those large numbers of Chinese soldiers who surrendered, and interned them near Hsiaohuamen, about 4 kilometers north. They were 7,200 in number.

On 15th, the 3rd and the 6th companies of the 20th Regiment sent these 7,200 prisoners under guard to a temporary prison camp near Hsiachilinmen, about 7 kilometers to the south, where they were interned. Two or three days later, they were

¹⁰⁾ Ibid., p.321. As for the number executed, the Iinuma Mamoru Nikki [the Diary of Iinuma Mamoru](Iinuma was the Chief of Staff of the Shanghai Expedition Army) gives 'one thousand several hundred', NSS vol.I, p.169, whereas Nakajima Kesago Nikki [the Diary of Nakajima Kesago](Nakajima was the Commander of the 16th Division) says 'about 1,300' (Dec.13,1937), *ibid.*, p.220.

¹¹⁾ NS, p.321.

sent under guard to a prison in the city of Nanking and interned there.¹²⁾ Thus, these 7,200 enemy soldiers were treated as prisoners of war and were not executed.

Sector C (Inside the walls. The city's southeastern corner lying between the eastern wall and Chungcheng Road, bounded by Chungshan East Road on the north and by Paihsia Road on the south)

The mopping up of this sector was assigned to the 35th Infantry Regiment (formed at Toyama) of the 9th Division (formed at Kanazawa), but immediately after the capture of Nanking, the 19th Regiment of the same Division did the mopping up. The same Regiment entered the city, passing the 36th Regiment that captured the Kuanghua Men Gate. The 19th Regiment mopped up the territory extending from about the said gate up to the Hanhsi Men Gate, west of Nanking. As to how the mopping up was carried out, Tsuchiya Masaharu, the 4th company commander of the same Regiment recalls as follows.¹³⁾

“On the morning of December 13, I was told to enter the city ahead of the 36th Regiment because the war potential of the same Regiment had decreased after a hard fighting. Once in the city, we were surprised to find the city admirably clean. Not a single fallen roof tile was spotted. The streets, too, were tidy. Indeed, the city was as silent as a graveyard. Men of my unit were especially brave, but an ominous silence such as we had never experienced overwhelmed us so much that three or four soldiers whom I had sent out scouting could not get about, much as they wanted to do so. Before I knew it, I was walking at the head of my unit. Soon we found ourselves in front of a big building. As we entered it, we were startled at the never-to-be-seen spectacle. In the room as spacious as a lecture hall, we found 60 to 70 disabled Chinese soldiers in bed, lying in rows, whom they could not remove to the rear before the Japanese advanced into the city. At their bedsides, white-clad nurses were standing at attention. Deeply impressed with the sight, I bowed my head and came out of the room. Then we went westward as far as the wall and turned back. Immediately afterward, hearing that our military headquarters at Tangshuichen was sieged by the enemy, we hurried there to aid, coming back to the city on December 15. In the meantime I kept thinking what had become of those nurses I saw and how I should have treated them. While we were mopping up, we never encountered any enemy soldier.”

Tsuchiya states that as far as the 19th Regiment and the 36th Regiment were concerned, they did no battle after their entry into Nanking on December 13, nor did

¹²⁾ Ibid., pp.168-169.

¹³⁾ Tsuchiya told Nakamura about this experience in the interview, Jul.9,1998.

they take anyone prisoner.¹⁴⁾ We may presume that when the Japanese troops advanced into the city, there were neither citizens nor remnants in sector C. Therefore, we may conclude that in this sector, no massacre could have taken place.

'Piles of corpses' is a lie. While I interviewed Tsuchiya, I put to him the following question, referring not only to sector C, but to the overall situation inside the walls of Nanking:

“According to the prosecution at the Tokyo Trial, it sounds as if the streets of Nanking were filled or piled with corpses as a result of the outrages committed by the Japanese troops. Their contention goes like this: ‘Sad wailing was heard everywhere; the ground was strewn with corpses and blood ran knee-deep.’¹⁵⁾ How many corpses did you see?”

Tsuchiya replied as follows:

“To tell the truth, in the battle at Yuhuatai, I found one good soldier missing. He was courageous enough to mount a nightly charge. When we occupied the point he had charged, we found him missing. So, coming back to the city from Tangshuichen, the whole company searched for him from December 16 onward. Later on, our regiment moved to the point east of Suchou. But I entreated my senior to let me stay in Nanking as I wanted to search for the missing subordinate. I was allowed to stay in Nanking then and there. I walked throughout the walled city, searching every corner for him, except for the Refugee Zone. But I never saw any single corpse. The story that there were piles of corpses is a lie—at least from my walking tour of the city.”¹⁶⁾

It is unlikely that there was not a single corpse inside the walls on December 16, but so far as the parts of Nanking where Tsuchiya walked about are concerned, we may conclude that there was not a single corpse. Even admitting that there were a considerable number of corpses outside the areas searched by Mr. Tsuchiya, we must say that the story that there were piles of corpses and that blood ran knee-deep is a lie. Sector D (Inside the walls. The area lying between Yichiang Men Gate on the north and Hanchung Road on the south, bounded by Chungshan and Chungshan North Roads on the east and northeast respectively, including the Safety Zone)

This sector has an area of about 10 square kilometers, the western part of which are mostly hills and forests. In the eastern part of this sector Government offices, diplomatic and consular offices and schools are legion. The southeast corner of this

¹⁴⁾ NS, p.179.

¹⁵⁾ The International Military Tribunal for the Far East [hereafter cited as IMTFE], Prosecution Document 1706. The literal translation of the said part of the original Chinese report prepared by the procurator of the district court, Nanking, goes: ‘...piled with corpses...’

¹⁶⁾ This interview is in my audio tapes.

sector was the International Safety Zone. A fairly large number of Chinese soldiers retreating from Chungshan Men Gate or from Chunghua Men Gate found it impossible to escape to Hsiakwan. So they infiltrated this sector and were hiding out there. Their choice of this place seemed quite natural in the light of its position, geographical features and several other factors involved. Viewed in this light, it was no wonder that the mopping up of this sector was extremely severe. The following is an outline of how mopping up was carried out and how prisoners were executed.

Treat all the citizens with courtesy. Remnants should be interned. On the early morning of December 13, the 35th Regiment of the 9th Division captured the Chungshan Men Gate and the 7th Regiment (formed at Kanazawa) of the same division captured the wall at a point south of the Chungshan Men Gate.

At 16:30 of the same day, the 6th Brigade, consisting of the above two regiments, issued “Guidelines for mopping up” and “Instructions concerning the mopping-up operation.”¹⁷⁾ Let us take up some of noteworthy items from “Guidelines for mopping up.”

1. In executing the mopping up operation, you should observe strictly Commander Matsui’s “Words and advice regarding an entry into the city.” However, an exception is made for the territory where the enemy continues resistance.
2. We presume that a great majority of enemy soldiers who have fled are disguised in plain clothes, so anyone who can be suspected to be so should be arrested and interned at a proper location.

According to the above instruction, it is clearly stated that, when detected, plainclothes soldiers should be interned instead of being executed.

Extracts from “Instructions concerning the mopping-up operation” are:

1. Before mopping up is carried out, hammer home Commander Matsui’s words and advice to each and every private.
2. Except in cases where the enemy is using them, you are never permitted to enter any facilities belonging to foreign rights and interests. See to it that sentries be posted at important points.
3. Mopping-up units are to be commanded by officers. Anyone whose rank is non-commissioned officer or below is absolutely forbidden to act independently.
4. Regard young and adult males as stragglers or plainclothes soldiers, and arrest them and keep them in detention.

¹⁷⁾ NSS vol.I, p.444.

5. Chinese civilians who do not behave in a hostile manner, especially elderly persons, women and children are to be treated kindly and leniently.
6. You are forbidden to enter banks and exchange houses.
7. Take precautions against entering private houses and doing anything similar to looting.
8. Anyone who commits arson or even causes an accidental fire shall be severely punished.
9. In case of fire, mopping-up units should endeavor to extinguish it.

These items of command order strictly that mopping up should be carried out in perfect order under the command of officers, warning soldiers strongly not to act independently or in violation of military discipline.

Mopping up by the 7th Infantry Regiment. Now, the 7th Infantry Regiment was in charge of mopping up sector D. The said regiment divided the sector into three zones. The 3rd Battalion took care of the north zone, the 1st Battalion the central zone and the 2nd Battalion the south zone. Let us take a look at how the 7th Regiment conducted its mopping-up operation.

December 14. Colonel Isa Kazuo, the 7th Infantry Regimental Commander, gave orders regarding the treatment of prisoners and foreign rights and interests.¹⁸⁾

1. We absolutely prohibit in our mopping-up sector any arbitrary activities by corps other than the 7th Infantry Regiment.
2. Intern prisoners whom each unit captured in one place in the mopping zone, and request their provisions to the Division.
3. It must be remembered that the 7th Infantry Regiment has not come to stay in the walled city, but has entered it as a mopping-up unit. Therefore, do not forget to get out of the walled city upon completion of the mopping up.
4. It is anticipated that there exist a large number of stragglers in the areas of foreign rights and interests. As for them, we will select and assign interpreters proficient in foreign languages. Each unit, therefore, has to keep watch on them from outside.
5. Be careful not to cause misunderstandings and conflicts with foreign people due to language difficulties.

¹⁸⁾ Ibid., p.515.

The above directives show that it was the policy of the 7th Infantry Regiment to intern prisoners and to provide them food instead of executing them, and that men of the 7th Regiment were prohibited from staying in the city after completion of the mopping up.

Furthermore, in the order issued by the 9th Division concerning the mopping-up units on December 16, it is stated that as regards their quartering, soldiers should conform to the provisions of the Field Duty Instructions.¹⁹⁾ Under these circumstances, it is hardly possible for soldiers to step out of their quartering place at night and walk around the city, committing rapes and other atrocities.

In the mopping up carried out on December 14, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Regiment, shot 70 to 80 straggling soldiers to death who showed signs of resistance, and interned 250 remnants as prisoners.

Muraoka Minoru and Enoki Katsuharu, commanders of tank companies that cooperated in the mopping up, testify as follows:

“At the crossroads on the Chungshan Road, soldiers got off the tank and entered a building that looked like a lecture hall, when they were subjected to firing by several tens of stragglers. So we machine-gunned barracks for enemy signal corps on the left side of the Chungshan Road, and captured about 150 armed enemy soldiers, and shot to death 3 or 4 of them who showed signs of resistance. We machine-gunned in order to lure out remnants, but we never made use of tank guns. Sergeant Kusaba, who was making contact with the 7th Infantry Regiment in a light armored car, saw our infantry men machine-gunning more than 80 enemy regular soldiers outside the Hanhsi Men Gate.”²⁰⁾

From this testimony, we can see that the said Japanese battalion took most of the remnants prisoners and executed only those who were likely to offer resistance.

December 15, 16. The 9th Division implemented divisional requisition in the operation area, and at the same time it went on with mopping up. There are some who view requisition as looting. However, it is not correct to argue about requisition and looting in the same breath.

¹⁹⁾ Ibid., p.445. Jinchu Yomurei [The Field Duty Instructions](Revised 1924) has minute rules concerning billeting. They provide that each billeting place should have a billet commander, an officer of the day, patrol officers and guards so that a strict watch should be kept on the inside and the outside of the billeting place. Article 356 provides that especially severe watch and surveillance being needed during the night, nightly watch and patrol should be strengthened, shops should be closed at early hours and soldiers should be made to go to bed early. All this shows how the Japanese Military authorities were taking special and scrupulous care about the maintenance of discipline and morale in and around the billeting place.

²⁰⁾ NS, p.194.

For example, in the implementation of requisition, the 7th Infantry Regiment organized 5 parties of men whose duty was to shield the commandeering of provisions, and the work was done under the command of pay officers.²¹⁾ It is not that soldiers stormed private houses and stole provisions as they liked.

December 16. The mopping up for this day by the 7th Infantry Regiment was done in accordance with the “7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order” issued at 20:30 on December 15. The gist of the order is as follows.²²⁾

1. Prisoners who had been arrested up to December 15 were only noncommissioned officers and privates, but no officers. It looks like officers changed their uniforms into plain clothes and are hiding in the Refugee Zone.
2. Tomorrow, 16th, the regiment shall concentrate its efforts on searching for stragglers in the Refugee Zone, round them up and exterminate them thoroughly.
3. Each battalion shall continue to mop up its assigned area, particularly the Refugee Zone.

If we compare this with the aforementioned “Guideline for mopping up” issued by the 6th Brigade on December 13, we will note that (internment) has been changed to (extermination.) The reason why the policy of the 7th Infantry Regiment toward mopping up has been rendered stringent may seem to have something to do with the nearness of the ceremonial entry into the city by the Central China Theater Army. The CCTA intended to make formal entry on December 17, but the Shanghai Expeditionary Force was opposed to the “17th timeframe ” on the ground that to hold such a ceremony on the 17th is to ‘force things,’ and suggested the 18th at the earliest. It had reported to that effect to the superior command. But the CCTA’s option for December 17 remained unchanged and on the 15th formal entry was officially set for the 17th.²³⁾

Thereupon, driven by the need to restore order immediately, the 7th Infantry Regiment had to shift to the above-mentioned stern policy. Such, some may argue, is the thought behind the change of policy of the 7th Infantry Regiment regarding the treatment of prisoners.

December 16. The entry for December 16 in the diary of Colonel Isa Kazuo, Commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment, goes:

“In the mopping up we have carried out for three days, we severely punished about

²¹⁾ Ibid., p.195.

²²⁾ NSS vol.I p.516.

²³⁾ Iinuma, op.cit., Dec.14,15,16, NSS vol.I, pp.156-158.

6,500 straggling soldiers.”²⁴⁾ By the phrase ‘Severely punish) we mean execution, that is, shooting or bayoneting (including beheading by sword). We must say that execution of 6,500 remnants during three-day mopping up is an extraordinarily colossal number.

According to the 7th Regiment’s table of mopping-up results achieved from December 13 to December 24, 6,670 remnants were either bayoneted or shot dead.²⁵⁾ This is also a remarkably large number of remnants executed. We will argue about the credibility of this figure later, but anyway, the fact remains that several thousands of remnants were executed from December 13 to 16. I regret to say that the reason the 7th Regiment executed such a legion of stragglers is not clear. Whether it did so in self-defense or for some other urgent reason is yet to be seen.

December 17. The Japanese Army made formal entry into the city. On 18th, a memorial service for the war dead was held under the joint auspices of the Japanese Army and Navy headquarters. On the 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd and 23rd, mopping up was resumed. And on the 24th, the 7th Regiment was relieved of the mopping-up duty, transferring it to the 16th Division.

When we look into the Nanking Incident, the above-mentioned execution of remnants by the 7th Infantry Regiment seems to assume a serious proportion. Therefore, we will discuss it again later on.

Sector E (Inside the walls. The southwestern corner of Nanking, bounded by Hanchung Road on the north and by the wall on the south, stretching from Chungcheng and Chunghua Roads westward to the wall)

Mopping up by the 47th Infantry Regiment. The task of mopping up this sector was assigned to the 6th Division (formed at Kumamoto). Around 10:00 on December 13, the 47th Regiment under the command of the 11th Infantry Brigade let the 2nd Battalion into the city, mopping up as far as Wutai-shan. No citizens, let alone enemy soldiers, were to be seen.

Morita Shogo, chief of the signal corps, has this to say:

“At that time, we spotted almost no enemy soldiers inside the wall near the Chunghua Men Gate. As for ordinary citizens, it was hard for us even to see a shadow.”

Abe Yasuhiko, rapid-fire gun battery commander, relates:

“Mopping up sounds rather exaggerated, for our main job was to clear uniforms, weapons and war materials the enemy had abandoned.”

Another story is told by Kondo Toshikiyo, a reporter for the Asahi-Shinbun newspaper: “At the Chunghua Men Gate, a fierce battle was fought and there were both Japanese

²⁴⁾ NSS vol.I, p.334.

²⁵⁾ Ibid., p.524.

and Chinese soldiers' dead bodies. But the number of those corpses did not strike me as large. Not a single dead citizen was found."²⁶⁾

Mopping up by the 13th Infantry Regiment. The 13th Regiment of the 11th Brigade mopped up the area at the right side of the 47th Regiment, that is, from the Chunghua Men Gate to the southern tip of the Chungcheng Road.

How was the mopping up done? On December 12, 1991, I went down to Kumamoto city to interview the veterans of the 13th Regiment who took part in the Nanking campaign. Here are eye-witness accounts of the veterans I interviewed.²⁷⁾

Takeshita Kaneo, the 1st Battalion adjutant, First Lieutenant:

"On December 13, we entered the walled city of Nanking by the Chunghua Men Gate. There was not a single Chinese soldier nor a single citizen. We saw no corpses around."

Furusawa Satoshi, a squad leader of the 1st platoon under the command of the 1st company:

"When we charged, things were not in a state where we could be engaged in hand-to-hand combat, for there was not a single enemy to be found. When the day broke, we entered the walled city and advanced several hundred meters, but we saw no citizen."

Kubota Hideto, gunner of the 2nd Battalion:

"As we walked straight from the Chunghua Men Gate, we saw on the right side of a crossroads some foreigners dressed like missionaries watching our entry, putting up a flag of the Red Swastika Society, accompanied by what seemed a thousand or so Chinese. We walked in front of this crowd of Chinese, but no trouble happened. We stayed in the walled city for a week or so and walked around here and there, but while we were there, we saw only five or six corpses. I was conscripted in 1933 and we learned international law in the army, so I gave thoughtful consideration to foreign rights and interests. For this reason or not I don't know, but anyway, the Chinese people looked peaceful and offered no resistance."

Yamamoto Tsuguyoshi, a squad leader of the 6th company:

"I was ordered to enter the walled city and call upon the Chinese to surrender. We mopped up the area of about 500 meters each to the left and right from the gate, but found no young men; only old men and women remained there."

Ide Suemitstu, a squad leader of the 6th company:

²⁶⁾ NS, p.222.

²⁷⁾ Nihon Goyurenmei Kumamoto-ken-shibu [Kumamoto Prefectural Branch of the Japan Ex-Soldiers' Association], *Dai-Nana-kai Nankin-mondai-o-kataru-kai Kaigiroku* [The Report on the 7th Meeting on the Nanking Incident], Dec.12,1991.

“I mounted the wall by the help of a rope-ladder. I saw a Chinese soldier climbing up the ladder just below, so I kicked him down. Entering the city, we took part in the mopping up operation as soon as the day broke, but not a soul nor a corpse was to be seen.”

As for the other witness accounts, I will have to omit them now, but the above testimonies confirm unanimously that inside the walls, no enemy soldiers nor citizens were spotted and that there was no need for mopping up.

The most impressive of all was that Kubota and other veterans I interviewed asserted positively that they did not fire even a single round. “With no enemy around, we didn’t have to fire,” they said.

The mopping up by the 23rd Infantry Regiment. The mopping up of the area along the western wall to the left of the 11th Brigade was assigned to the 23rd Regiment that belonged to the 36th Infantry Brigade under the commander of the 6th Division.

The 23rd Infantry Regiment entered the city through the breach in the wall near the southwestern corner of the city at 08:00 on December 13.

Starting from the southwestern corner at 10:00, it mopped up the area along the western wall, advancing northward, but with no enemy soldiers in sight, the 23rd Regiment reached Chingliang-shan, 800 meters north of the Hanhsi Men Gate at 14:30.²⁸⁾ From this description, it is evident that almost no enemy soldiers nor citizens remained in this area and that in these circumstances, there was no executing of large numbers of remnants, no raping nor slaughtering of innocent citizens.

Sector F (Inside the walls. The city’s southernmost corner, north to Paihsia Road and east to Tungchi Men Gate, bounded by Chunghua Road on the west)

The mopping up of this sector was assigned to the 66th and 102nd Infantry Regiments (formed respectively at Utsunomiya and Mito) under the command of the 114th Division.

Mopping up by the 66th Infantry Regiment. The 66th Infantry Regiment made an assault upon the wall east of the Chunghua Men Gate on the afternoon of December 12. According to the battle report of the 1st Battalion of the same regiment, it had mowed down 700 enemy soldiers by the evening of the same day, capturing more than 1,500 prisoners. When it got the first portion of prisoners, the commander sent three of them to the enemy headquarters, advising the remaining soldiers to surrender. The commander’s advice worked. The unit rounded up the prisoners on the railway track running just outside the wall, and searched them. In general, the prisoners observed

²⁸⁾ NS, p.219.

strictly what the guards instructed them to do. On the night of the same day, the prisoners were interned at a European-style building in the guard area of the 4th company. 20 of them were selected to prepare meals for their fellow prisoners. The unit entered the walled city by the Chunghua Men Gate on the morning of December 13. Enemy soldiers surrendered one after another. By 09:00, the unit had captured more than 300 prisoners. At 14:00 on the same day, it received the order from the Regiment commander to the effect that by the order of the Brigade, all the prisoners should be executed. As for the method of execution, the said commander suggested that several tens of prisoners be tied up at one time and shot dead group by group. Based upon this command, the regiment assigned an equal number of prisoners to each of the 1st, 3rd and 4th companies. It decided to have each company take out about fifty of them at one time from the prison and bayonet them to death in three places south of the wall. The execution commenced at 17:00 and ended at 19:30.²⁹⁾

According to the aforementioned battle report, from December 10 to 13, the 1st Battalion captured 18 enemy officers, and 1,639 warrant officers, noncommissioned officers and privates put together. This means that 1,657 prisoners were executed in all. It is not clear what reasons or circumstances compelled the battalion to execute those Chinese soldiers, whom it had once interned as prisoners. Takamatsu Han'ichi, a private of the 4th company, who actually engaged in this execution says:

“At that time, there were only 70 to 80 soldiers in each company who were capable of doing the kind of work expected of them. The numbers of prisoners, too, were not even half as large as what the battle report says. The 4th company executed just around 100 prisoners.”³⁰⁾

Be that as it may, the fact remains that over 1,000 prisoners were killed with bayonets, perhaps for no good reason, in the southernmost sector of Nanking.

Sector G (Outside the walls. Near Chiantung Men between the western wall of the city and the Yangtze River)

As we have already seen, in the early morning of December 13, the 45th Regiment encountered the 51st and the 58th Divisions of the Chinese army retreating from Hsiakwan, and in a close and fierce battle fought in a dense fog the Japanese smashed about 2,300 enemy soldiers. It was, however, a regular fighting, and no mopping-up operation.

Sector H (Outside the walls. Hsiakwan)

When the 2nd Battalion of the 45th Infantry Regiment under the command of the 6th

²⁹⁾ NSS vol.I, pp.560-572.

³⁰⁾ NS, p.318.

Division, reached Hsiakwan on the early morning of December 14, it found the square full of 5,000 to 6,000 unarmed Chinese soldiers. So it released all of them on the spot. Just about the same time it received the regimental order: "Get back to Chiangtungmen and take up quarters there." Thereupon, the 2nd Battalion headed for Chiangtungmen, 7 kilometers to the south. Most of the prisoners thus released seem to have escaped either southward to Chianghsin-chou or eastward in the direction of Mufu-shan Hill.

Sector I (Outside the walls. Chianghsin-chou. Sandbank in the Yangtze, southwest of Nanking)

The 41st Infantry Regiment or the Kunisaki unit that captured Puko on the night of December 13 had taken 120 Chinese soldiers prisoners during the battle that was fought from December 13 to December 15. On the evening of December 14, the 12th company of the same regiment, together with the 7th company, disarmed 2,350 Chinese who surrendered on Chianghsin-chou sandbank, and took them prisoners. But they set them all free in consideration of their obedience. Considering the said regiment had leniently either interned or released their prisoners since landing on the shore of Hangchow Bay, it is believed that the above 120 prisoners, too, were released.³¹⁾

Our guess is that a great majority of the 2,350 prisoners were those repulsed by the 45th Infantry Regiment at Chiangtungmen on the morning of December 13 plus those liberated by the same 45th Regiment at Hsiakwan on December 14.

If we examine how the prisoners were treated by the 45th and the 41st regiments, we will see that the Japanese army, in some cases, released large numbers of prisoners with great leniency.

Sector J (Outside the walls. Mufu-shan Hill, 3 kilometers north of the northern wall of the city, and its vicinity)

On December 14, the main force of the 13th Division (formed at Sendai) crossed the Yangtze at Chenchiang to the northern bank. The Yamada Brigade, with the 65th Infantry Regiment (formed at Aizuwakamatsu) as its skeleton, headed for Mufu-shan Hill and captured the battery on the hill on the morning of December 14. The brigade's treatment of the many prisoners it captured gave rise to the 'Massacre' rumor in later years, so, we will look into this issue.

14,000 Chinese surrendered. On December 14, the said brigade commanded by Major General Yamada Senji captured 14,777 Chinese who surrendered near the battery on Mufu-shan Hill (An entry for December 14, the Diary of Yamada).³²⁾ The brigade released noncombatants of them, and interned the remaining 8,000 or so Chinese

³¹⁾ Ibid., p.335.

³²⁾ NSS vol.I, p.331.

soldiers as prisoners, but on the night of 15th a fire broke out at prison camp (most likely, it was incendiary). In the confusion of the moment, about half of the prisoners ran away. Short of guards and short of food for the prisoners, Yamada was at a loss what to do with the large number of prisoners. At last he decided to release the remaining roughly 4,000 prisoners to the opposite side of the Yangtze. On the night of 17th, the 1st Battalion of the 65th Regiment sent them under guard to the bank, but soon after they reached the bank, the prisoners became panic-stricken and revolted. So, in the darkness of night, the guard unit machine-gunned and mowed about 1,000 prisoners (3,000, according to another account), but the rest ran away.³³⁾ Seven Japanese soldiers, including one officer, of the guard unit died.

Account of the Regiment Commander. According to Morozumi Gyosaku who was then the commander of the 65th Regiment, prisoners were treated as follows:

When we released noncombatants, some 8,000 men remained, but at least 4,000 of them escaped by taking advantage of the confusion that resulted from the fire deliberately caused. After this, the Shanghai Expeditionary Force urged us repeatedly to 'dispose of' the prisoners (which meant to execute them), with the formal entry around the corner. Major General Yamada gave flat refusal to this demand. He even demanded that the Shanghai Expeditionary Force intern prisoners. At last the military order came pressing for the execution of the prisoners. Thereupon Major General Yamada had no choice but to instruct the 65th Infantry Regiment to execute prisoners. But I could not in any way bring myself to do that. Then I secretly ordered Major Tayama Yoshio, the 1st Battalion commander, to assemble the prisoners on the south bank of the Yangtze and send them by boat to the opposite bank and thus release them under cover of the darkness. At midnight on December 17, Major Tayama and his men loaded 200 to 300 prisoners in a light boat and sent them as far as the middle stream of the Yangtze, when the Chinese soldiers deployed on the opposite bank, mistaking those prisoners for Japanese soldiers crossing the river in an attempt to attack them, opened up fire on the prisoners. Prisoners, on this side of the river, mistook this for the sound of shooting by the Japanese army; hence dreadful confusion ensued. Some 2,000 prisoners tried to escape desperately, so the guard unit had to suppress them by gunfire. A great majority of prisoners fled by land. Some of them jumped into the Yangtze. The bodies of prisoners killed by our gunfire, which I

³³⁾ *Senshi-shitsu, Shina-jihen Rikugun-sakusen* [The Japanese Defense Agency's Military History Office, Military Operations in the China Incident](Tokyo, Asagumo-shinbunsha, 1975), p.437.

saw next morning, were very small in number. This is the truth. When I reported to Major General Yamada on everything that had happened, he looked relieved and perfectly satisfied.³⁴⁾

What was the purpose of taking out prisoners? Was it to set them free or to execute them? There is no adequate material which enables us to judge whether the purpose of taking prisoners to the bank of the Yangtze was to set them free or to execute them, except for an entry for December 17 in the diary of Morozumi, the regimental commander, which runs like this:

“Participated in the entry into Nanking. The 1st Battalion preparing for the release of prisoners. On the same night, released them.³⁵⁾

If this entry is correct, we may presume that prisoners became panic and so the shooting ensued almost unexpectedly in the process of releasing them.

Didn't this serve as a hint for Lu Su's story that 57,000 persons were butchered? Putting aside the question whether the above occurrence was planned or accidental, it is a fact that an army of prisoners was shot dead on the bank near the village of Shangyuanmen. After World War II, a Chinese named Lu Su came out with a farfetched argument that he saw with his own eyes 57,418 Chinese soldiers and civilians massacred by the Japanese army on Mufu-shan Hill and on the nearby bank of the Yangtze, and in this connection the large-scale shooting of prisoners by the 65th Regiment seems to be of special significance in that it may have served as a hint for Lu Su's fabricated story.

The above is a rough sketch of how mopping up was implemented in and out of the Nanking walls from December 13 to 17, and how, in this process, straggling soldiers and prisoners of war were treated by the Japanese army. This may help to form an overall picture of what the situation was like in and out of the walled city of Nanking at the time it fell and of what took place and what did not take place there. (See CHART 1 on page 22)

³⁴⁾ NSS vol.II, pp.339-340.

³⁵⁾ A copy of the original handwritten memorandum, in my file.

CHART 1

Number of Chinese POWs released or executed

	Sector	Date	Unit (s)	Number of the released or interned	Number of the killed *In battle	Notes
1	A	Dec. 14	4/20i (16D)		328	POWs executed by shooting
2	"	"	"		600	POWs executed by shooting
3	A1	Dec. 13 " 14	1/9i (16D)		0	
4	A2	Dec. 14	12/20i (16D) 3MG/20i (16D)		*200~ 300	Assailants captured and shot to death
5	B	Dec. 14	38i (- II ,10)(16D)		0	
6	B1	Dec. 13	33i (16D)		*2,000	Soldiers (and civilians?) mowed down while attempting a flight across the Yangtze
7	"	Dec. 14	33i (16D)		200	POWs executed
8	"	Dec. 10 ~14	33i (16D)		3,096	POWs executed
9	B2	Dec. 13	33i (16D)		1,000 + 300?	POWs (?) executed
10	B3	Dec. 14	10/38i (16D) 9/20i (16D)	7,200		Surrenderers disarmed and interned
11	C	Dec. 13	4/19i (9D)		0	
12	D	Dec. 13 ~24	7i (9D)		6,670	POWs including misidentified civilians executed by shooting and bayoneting
13	E	Dec. 13	13i (6D)		0	
14	"	"	23i (6D)		0	
15	"	"	47i (6D)		0	
16	F	Dec. 10 ~13	1,3,4/66i (114D)		1,657	POWs executed by bayoneting
17	G	Dec. 13	III/45i (6D)		*2,300	Killed in a close combat
18	H	Dec. 14	II/45i (6D)	5,000~ 6,000		Unarmed soldiers caught While gathering and released on the spot
19	I	Dec. 14	7,12/41i	2,350		Surrenderers released
20	J	Dec. 16 ~17	65i	6,700	1,000~ 8,000	POWs executed by shooting 6,700 noncombatants released
21	A~F	Dec. 24 ~Jan. 5	33i,38i (16D)	2,000~ 3,000		Stragglers and wounded soldiers interned
22					*2,000~ 3,000	Hostile stragglers executed
Total				min. 23,250 max. 25,250	min. 14,551 max. 21,851	Excluding the numbers killed in battle (4,6,17,22)

II The heart of the matter

The execution of prisoners by the 7th and the 65th Regiments. What is the truth of the so-called Nanking Incident or Nanking massacre? As we will describe later, it is by no means a systematic or planned massacre of more than 300,000 citizens by the Japanese army. The Nanking incident as I see it is nothing but an exaggerated, embellished and distorted account of the execution of a large number of prisoners. As we have seen above, when the Japanese troops captured Nanking, they executed or released many Chinese prisoners. A large-scale execution took place in Sector D, where the 7th Infantry Regiment slaughtered more than 6,000 prisoners and in Sector J where the 65th infantry Regiment machine-gunned about 4,000 to 15,000 prisoners. In the above two cases, large numbers of prisoners were herded together before the eyes of other Chinese, which naturally gave rise to rumors mixed with truth and falsehood. In Sector F a large scale execution of 1,657 prisoners by the 66th Infantry Regiment took place, but in this sector, there remained few citizens and, what was more, the scene of execution was far from the residential district for foreigners, so we may presume no one witnessed the execution, though carried out on such a large scale. I hold that the first two cases alone arrested the attention of citizens and foreigners in and out of the walls. We will, therefore, give these two cases further consideration.

1. THE EXECUTION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF PRISONERS BY THE 7TH REGIMENT

Change of orders--from 'internment' to 'extermination' As we have stated in an entry for Sector D, on the morning of December 13, Major General Akiyama Yoshimitsu of the 6th Infantry Brigade (the 7th and the 35th Regiments) gave out "Guidelines for mopping up within the walls" and "Instructions concerning the mopping-up operation" which called for the internment of all arrested plainclothes soldiers. But the operation order of the 7th Infantry Regiment issued on the 15th was changed to an extremely rigorous phraseology: "Round up and exterminate stragglers thoroughly." Why was the internment of prisoners changed to the extermination of them? The reason may have something to do with the fact that on December 15 formal entry into the city was officially set for the 17th in accordance with the policy of Central China Theater Army. As a result, the 7th Regiment, compelled to restore order quickly and completely, decided to execute so many prisoners. One may account for the change of orders like this.

The diary of Regimental Commander Isa. Even so, a question still remains. If the change of orders had been due to the fact that formal entry was set for the 17th, 6,670

prisoners should have been all executed on the 16th, the day after the order for extermination of prisoners was issued. However, it is hardly conceivable that such a mass execution was possible in a single day, no matter how hurried. Therefore, quite naturally one is led to suspect that even prior to the 15th prisoners were executed against the said Brigade order.

This suspicion is all the more strengthened by the diary of Colonel Kazuo Isa, Commander of the 7th Regiment. In the entry for December 16 of his diary, it is stated like this. "In the mopping up we have carried out for three days, we severely punished about 6,500 straggling soldiers." By "severely punishing" we mean of course execution. In this sense, the said entry means that they executed about 6,500 prisoners in three days, that is, December 14, 15 and 16.

This is a violation of the instructions issued by the commander of the 6th Brigade on the 13th, that stragglers and plainclothes soldiers should be kept in detention. More than anything else, it is contrary to the order that the regimental commander Isa himself issued on the 14th to "intern prisoners and request their provisions to the Division." Wasn't Colonel Isa aware that such an execution of prisoners was against not only the instructions of the brigade commander but also his own regimental order? Be that as it may, it would be difficult to justify the mass execution of more than 6,000 prisoners by the pressing circumstances caused by the schedule of the ceremonial entry into the city.

What circumstances made the mass execution imperative? I went to Kanazawa city several times to interview and get first hand information from the veterans of the 7th Regiment as to the circumstances that necessitated such a mass execution of prisoners. This I wanted to do partly for the honor of the 7th Regiment. But my efforts got nowhere. The people I interviewed invariably denied even having known of the mass execution. If there were some unavoidable circumstances that compelled them to execute large numbers of prisoners, they should frankly tell the truth. Such frankness would, in my opinion, go a long way toward recovering the honor and dignity of the Japanese Army, not to mention the 7th Regiment. It is much to be regretted, however, that as matters stand now, the circumstances or reasons that justify the mass execution of more than 6,000 prisoners are yet to be found.

Was a temporary internment of prisoners an impossibility? Even admitting that the 7th Regiment had to restore order and security in their mopping-up zone before the formal entry scheduled for the 17th, we doubt if this could be a sufficient reason for such a mass execution of prisoners. Of course, it would have been utterly impossible under the circumstances to court-martial over 6,000 suspects, and judge them guilty or

not in a day or two. And yet, it would have been possible for the Japanese to intern them as a temporary step until it held a court-martial later on. There were enough facilities to intern them within the walls.

If the Japanese Army authorities had interned suspects under strict surveillance until the formal entry was over, and then had tried them in a court-martial, no serious problem would have occurred.

Guessing the number of prisoners shot dead by the number of bullets fired. So far we have argued about the executing of 6,670 or roughly more than 6,000 prisoners by the 7th Regiment as an established fact. But these figures themselves still remain open to question. The following is from the table of the mopping-up results within the Nanking walls from December 13 to 24 by the 7th Regiment: ³⁶⁾

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. The number of bullets spent | 5,000 by rifles |
| | 2,000 by heavy machine guns |
| 2. The number of straggling soldiers | |
| bayoneted or shot dead | 6,670 |

Now it seems very difficult to accept the number 6,670 at its face value when we compare it with the number of bullets spent recorded as above. The reason is as follows:

It is most likely that mass execution of remnants was carried out chiefly by machine guns. But then, all that 2,000 heavy machine gun bullets can do would be to slaughter at most several hundreds of men.

If so, we will have to guess that a great majority of the 6,670 stragglers (more than 6,000?) were bayoneted by non-commissioned officers and privates. According to the table of casualties of the 7th Infantry Regiment, non-commissioned officers and privates who were in fine shape as of December 24 numbered 2,378.³⁷⁾ So, if we assume that all of them took part in the execution, then we will have to conclude that they bayoneted an average of 2 or 3 remnants each. But here a question arises how each individual soldier could repeat merciless bayoneting of enemy soldiers who show no resistance. It is most unlikely that a man of normal mentality could bear repeating such cruelties. Therefore, We cannot easily believe that one regiment was able to bayonet as many as 6,000 or so remnants. As for the number of bullets spent, we find it difficult to accept the number of 2,000 or 5,000 at its face value; it strikes us as quite unnatural. In reality, it must have been far less. It seems to me that the number was exaggerated to some extent by way of playing up the war results. So if the number of

³⁶⁾ NSS vol.I, p.524.

³⁷⁾ Ibid., p.519.

bullets spent were less, cases of bayoneting would increase accordingly, and thus the story would become all the more unreasonable. Therefore, it will be safe for us to take the story of the mass execution by the 7th Regiment with some reservations.

A riddle in the list of weapons captured. In the preceding paragraphs, we argued that the number of bullets spent by the 7th Regiment was too small for the execution of most, if not all, of the 6,670 stragglers, the number being only just enough to mow down several hundreds, and bayoneting 6,000 or so nonresistant humans being impracticable, concluded that the reliability of the large-scale execution of 6,670 stragglers had to be questioned.

However, since I sincerely hope to seek the truth without prejudice I would dare, for fairness' sake, to make some reservation on my own conclusion regarding this matter. What arrested my attention was the list of 'Spoils by the 7th Regiment' on the table of the mopping-up results within the Nanking walls (aforementioned). Therein we find a list of many kinds of weapons, rounds and war supplies of all kinds (in terms of items and quantity) captured by the 7th Regiment.³⁸⁾ As for small arms, they are described as follows:

Rifles: 960	Rifle bullets: 390,000 rounds
Water-cooled heavy machine guns: 12	Light machine guns: 33
Pistols: 103	Pistol bullets: 201,350 rounds

What strikes us as strange is that no mention is made of the number of bullets which the 7th Regiment captured as far as heavy and light machine guns are concerned. As regards rifles and pistols, the number of bullets captured is mentioned along with them, but how is it that no reference is made to the number of bullets regarding the captured machine guns?

While pistols and rifles were captured together with their bullets, machine guns were captured with no bullets to go with, and I feel there is something unnatural about there being no entry of machine-gun bullets in the list. My guess then is that the vast number of machine-gun bullets the 7th Regiment may have captured were spent in executing more than 6,000 stragglers, hence no entry of them in the list. This is of course my mere guessing and there still is no evidence to prove it right.

Mass execution of plainclothes soldiers was mistaken for slaughtering of citizens. The hunting out of straggling soldiers from the safety zone by the 7th Regiment was carried out in broad daylight. They were herded together and carried off to the bank of the Yangtze in groups of several hundreds in full view of many other Chinese and

³⁸⁾ Ibid., p.524.

foreigners, and they were shot or bayoneted there. All the stragglers hunted out were wearing civilian clothes, so they must have struck onlookers, particularly foreigners, as being ordinary citizens. A foreigner took pictures of the scene with a hidden camera. One who sees them might well believe that innocent citizens are being herded together. But in reality, they were soldiers disguised as civilians, though, of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that there were poor citizens who were mistaken for soldiers.

The scene of execution within the walls or on the bank of the Yangtze was witnessed by foreign correspondents and Japanese reporters. For instance, F. Tillman Durdin, a correspondent for the New York Times, witnessed the execution of 200 men on the bank of the Yangtze and wrote an article about the execution to the said newspaper.³⁹⁾ I think that the herding together of so many plainclothes soldiers and the execution of them in broad daylight in large measure accounts for the unfounded rumor of the massacre of Nanking. The Chinese, however, through their skillful propaganda, have successfully deceived the rest of the world into believing that what happened in Nanking was a planned and systematic massacre of ordinary citizens, thereby making the fact of the matter distorted and blurred.

2.THE EXECUTION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF PRISONERS CAPTURED ON MUFU-SHAN HILL

The number 57,418. Another incident which seems to have led to the rumor 'Massacre of Nanking' is the aforementioned machine-gunning of about 4,000 to 15,000 prisoners the 65th Infantry Regiment had captured on Mufu-shan Hill. What seems to be related to this happening is the statement made by a Chinese named Lu Su to the procurator of the District Court of Nanking on Jan. 24, 1946, which was submitted to the Tokyo trial as the prosecutor's evidence and accepted by the court. The testimony runs as follows:

Upon entry of Nanking, Chinese civilians of both sexes and of all ages, as well as retreating soldiers, totaling 57,418, were interned by Japanese in the villages at Mu-Fu Hill. Many died since neither water nor food was given. Many were frozen to death. In the evening of Dec. 16th, 1937, those who were still alive were marched off to Tsao-Shie-Chia, at Shia-Kwen, in a column of four, while each two were bound together by lead wire. There they were machine-gunned, followed by repeated bayonet thrusts. Corpses were burnt with kerosene and, at last, the remains of the burnt corpses were thrown into the river.⁴⁰⁾

³⁹⁾ The New York Times, Dec.18,1937.

⁴⁰⁾ IMTFE, Prosecution Document 1702, p.10.

How could the man by the name of Lu Su count the enormously vast number of 57,418 persons (or corpses) with such minute accuracy? No man of common sense would trust such a number. But what is surprising is that at the Tokyo trial the court accepted this preposterous number as it was. If we subtract this number from the alleged number of the massacred as being hardly credible, the total number of the victims will at once become by nearly 20 percent smaller. Even such a simple calculation will be enough to refute the accusation that 300,000 men were massacred in Nanking. Lu Su's statement, though preposterous, is worth special mention in that it shows us how irresponsible and unfair the Tokyo trial was.

Release or execution? Needless to say, Lu Su's statement is hardly credible. Is his story, then, a pure fiction which he created out of nothing? The number of victims, 57,418, that Lu Su gave is of course entirely groundless. The figure is a result of his mere wild fancy, it is true, but again for fairness' sake, I would say that there are some reasons to suppose that as for the outline of the story itself, he took some hints from what actually happened. My belief is that what suggested to Lu Su the idea of making up a story of the Japanese massacre of Chinese military and civilian captives was very likely the aforesaid large-scale machine-gunning of prisoners by the 65th Regiment.

The sight of as many as 4,000 or more prisoners herded together and taken to the bank of the Yangtze through Shangyuanmen from the village near Mufu-Shan Hill could not have gone unnoticed. This incident certainly would not have gone unwitnessed nor the pandemonium and firing on the bank unheard. As the rumor of this disaster spread from mouth to mouth, it was naturally seasoned with imagination and distorted sensationally, till at last it gave rise to Lu Su's fabrication.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that by and large Lu Su's story coincides with the very incident that took place in the following points:

1. The Japanese army captured a legion of prisoners on Mufu-shan Hill.
2. It interned them in some structures near Shangyuanmen.
3. It took them off to the bank of the Yangtze.
4. It shot them dead.
5. Probably most of the corpses were thrown into the river.

With this setting in mind, Lu Su embellished his account of the event and fabricated the massacre of 57,418 prisoners. This is probably what his exaggerated statement was all about.

III 'Gyokusatsu'

1. WHAT IS 'GYAKUSATSU'?

Unlawful murder of a large number of people--Definition 1. The Japanese 'Nankin-daigyokusatsu' will most commonly be translated as the Nanking massacre. Massacre means the killing of large numbers of people unlawfully, and unlawful killing on the battlefield or in guarded areas means the killing of the enemy without court-martial, except when killing is done in self-defense. Thus 'daigyokusatsu' or massacre can be defined as killing a large number of people unlawfully. Let this be definition 1.

Cruel murder--Definition 2. Definition 1 is not enough to define 'gyokusatsu.' The first notion the Japanese have of 'gyokusatsu' or butchery is that of cruel murder. They do not question whether the reason for and the purpose of murder is justifiable or not nor do they care how many or few are those murdered. They are concerned only about whether the method of killing was cruel or not. Then what is 'cruel'? It would be enough to define cruelty as the quality or condition of causing unnecessary pain or being merciless. In this sense, bayoneting someone who is unable to resist will come under the category of 'cruel killing.'

So 'gyokusatsu' or butchery can be defined as murder by cruel means. Let this be **definition 2.**

The above **definitions 1 and 2** are very simple, but I think that they are handy and useful when it comes to dealing with the 'gyokusatsu' issue in Nanking.

When we apply these definitions to the execution of more than 10,000 men described before, we will find these definitions go a long way toward judging whether or not it is appropriate to call the execution 'gyokusatsu'.

2. PRISONERS OF WAR

The killing of prisoners. What is called the massacre of Nanking is, as a matter of fact, the execution of prisoners, as we have already stated. The question then may be asked, 'Were prisoners massacred?' If we examine the matter with the foregoing definitions in mind, we should be able to answer the question. But, before doing so, we will tackle the question as to whether or not it is appropriate or lawful to kill prisoners of war.

What is the definition of prisoners? Then, what is a prisoner (of war)? No complicated definition is necessary. As Dr. Shinobu Junpei argues, a prisoner is one who, by being

captured or by surrender, has fallen into the power of the enemy.⁴¹⁾ It does not matter in what circumstances he fell into the enemy's power. He may have been captured at the end of fighting or when wounded. He may have become a captive while fleeing or in hiding. He may have surrendered on his own or he may have surrendered at the order of his commander. In all these cases, he can be a prisoner. He does not have to show that he is willing to surrender by waving a white flag.

Then, how about the Chinese soldiers who were in hiding in the disguise of civilians in the Safety Zone in Nanking and were hunted out by the Japanese troops? Can they be prisoners? According to my view, once they are in the hands of their enemy, they are prisoners. It does not matter whether the soldiers in question are wearing military uniforms or civilian clothes. So long as they are under our control, with no means of resistance, they are prisoners of war and should be treated as such.

Are plainclothes soldiers disqualified as prisoners? Then, how about a plainclothes soldier—a soldier who attacks his enemy all of a sudden in the disguise of a civilian? Is he disqualified as a prisoner of war even after he has fallen into the enemy's hands?

Let us refer to the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land of the 18th October, 1907. Article 1 of the Regulations goes:

Article 1.—The laws, rights and duties of war apply not only to the army but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling all the following conditions:

1. They must be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. They must have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
3. They must carry arms openly; and
4. They must conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

Drawing on this clause, some Japanese researchers on the Nanking Incident argue that plainclothes soldiers, as they fail to meet the above conditions, cannot qualify as belligerents, so when captured, they have no right to be treated as prisoners of war. Those researchers contend that it is not in any way against the wartime international law to execute captured plainclothes soldiers just because they do not qualify as belligerents.

I do not, however, agree to this argument. Plainclothes soldiers do not meet the conditions given in Article 1 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention

⁴¹⁾ Shinobu Junpei, *Senji-Kokusaiho Kogi* [On Wartime International Law](Tokyou, Maruzen Inc., 1941), vol.2, pp.97-98.

Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, it is true, and in this sense, when captured, they may not have the same right as regular soldiers in captivity, but even so, once in the power of their enemy, they too are prisoners, and should be treated as such. It is wrong to contend that captured plainclothes soldiers have no right to any protection of law and that it is lawful to kill them without any reason or without even the semblance of a trial. Prisoners are prisoners, whether in military uniforms or civilian clothes, and should be treated humanely.

Treatment of prisoners. It is stipulated in the Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War signed at Geneva, July 27, 1929, as follows:

Article 2.--Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or formation which captured them. They shall at all times be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence, from insults and from public curiosity. Measures of reprisal against them are forbidden.

Therefore, it is a general rule to treat prisoners humanely and killing them is forbidden. If killing of prisoners be permitted, it will be limited to the case where they dare to threaten the security of those who supervise them.

However, even when you have no choice but to kill prisoners, you should bring them to trial by court-martial as far as circumstances permit and handle them according to the verdict rendered. Except when you kill prisoners in self-defense for the sake of your own security, it goes against the spirit of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war to execute prisoners without a trial.

Execution of plainclothes soldiers. Viewed in this light, the execution of prisoners without any justification is, in general, a violation of wartime international law, but when we have captured plainclothes soldiers, how should we handle them? As regards the treatment of such soldiers, there are some who argue as follows: a plainclothes soldier is disqualified as a belligerent according to the stipulation in the Hague Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Anyone who is disqualified as a belligerent has no right to be treated as a prisoner. Therefore, it is not unlawful for us to execute as a war criminal any plainclothes soldier whom we have captured.⁴²⁾

Such argument misinterprets the spirit of wartime international law in the following respects:

⁴²⁾ For example, Higashinakano Osamichi, *'Nankin-gyakusatsu' no Tettei-Kensho* [A Thorough Study of the 'Nanking Massacre'] (Tokyo, Tendensha, 1998), pp.195-197.

1. The argument that a plainclothes soldier does not qualify as a prisoner is wrong. A plainclothes soldier, though not qualified as a belligerent, is still a prisoner once in the power of the enemy. Opinions may be divided as to whether such illegitimate belligerents should be entitled to all the rights guaranteed by the Hague Convention. It is by no means against reason that such unlawful belligerents should be handled differently from other prisoners, but anyway, as long as they are in captivity, they should be treated as prisoners.

2. It is extremely unfair to assert that once we have captured plainclothes soldiers, we may with good reason execute them as war criminals. As regards the execution of plainclothes soldiers, let us refer to the contention of Dr. Shinobu:

“A plainclothes soldier is disqualified as a belligerent and yet is engaged in a hostile action, so he is evidently offending the laws and customs of war. Therefore, when caught in the act, he may be likened to an unexpected assailant, and we may of course kill him on the spot in self-defense or round him up and accuse him of violating martial law.”⁴³⁾

What is essential here is that Dr. Shinobu asserts that any plainclothes soldier *caught in the act of assaulting* may be killed on the spot. This means that the execution of plainclothes soldiers is permitted only in the cases in which they are caught in the act. But in the case of prisoners who later turn out to have been plainclothes soldiers, their execution cannot be justified.

In short, plainclothes soldiers who became military captives will be handled as follows:

1. A plainclothes soldier who became a military captive is a prisoner of war.
2. Therefore, he must be humanely treated as a prisoner.
3. Should an occasion arise where he should be punished, he must be tried by court-martial.

3. EXECUTION OF PRISONERS

Based upon the above principles, let us look into the execution of Chinese prisoners by the Japanese Army. For convenience sake, we will take up sectors B1, D, F and J where

⁴³⁾ Shinobu, op. cit. vol.2, p.83.

bulk of prisoners were executed.

<Sector B1>

On arriving at Hsiakwan at 2:30 p.m. on December 13, the 33rd Regiment found an immense number of remnants making their escape across the Yangtze river, using boats, rafts and other floating objects. The regiment fiercely fired at them for two hours and it was estimated that the Japanese had mowed down no less than 2,000 enemy soldiers.

Was this large-scale killing a lawful act of hostilities or was it unlawful? In my opinion, shooting fleeing enemy soldiers is an act constituting part of a pursuit battle, so it cannot be called unlawful. Neither **definition of gyakusatsu**, therefore, can be applied in this case.

On the following day, the same regiment captured about 200 Chinese soldiers who, after stubborn resistance, abandoned their weapons and surrendered. They were apparently executed. This is unlawful killing of a large number of prisoners and a case where at least **definition 1** can be applied.

As we have already seen, the detailed battle report of the 33rd Regiment says that from December 10 to 14, it captured 3,096 enemy officers and men, and executed them. The reason for this large-scale killing is not known, but seeing that no trouble or danger was reported, the execution was most probably unlawful. We may safely conclude that it was a case of **gyakusatsu**.

<Sector D>

The remnants who were hunted out in the Safety Zone were prisoners of war after they became captive, but they were shot or bayoneted to death without ever being tried at court-martial or without any justifiable reason for self-defense. Therefore, such an execution comes under **definitions 1 and 2**. We cannot but conclude that the execution of 6,670 prisoners was a massacre. Let us discuss one or two controversial points regarding our conclusion.

1. The citizens who were misidentified as plainclothes soldiers.

It may be imagined that among the executed there were not a few noncombatants mistaken for plainclothes soldiers, which might increase the illegality of the mass execution. Sato Shinju, a cameraman and reporter for Tokyo Nichinichi shinbun who took part in the Nanking campaign, told me that he was pestered by a number of Chinese for the release of their relatives who were being taken away by the Japanese soldiers. He took a photo of a Chinese woman making such an appeal.⁴⁴⁾ Had those

⁴⁴⁾ Sato told this when I interviewed him on Dec. 12,1997. Audio tape in my file. The photograph in NSS vol.II, p.41.

arrested Chinese been tried at court-martial, it might have turned out that they were noncombatants and they might have been spared their lives. It is true that soldiers were sifted by examination from civilians in the Safety Zone, but a story is told of how slovenly such sifting was done. It is open to question whether the situation was so pressing that the Japanese Army had no time whatever to hold even a simplified court-martial.

2. Confiscated enemy weapons.

As we have described before, the 7th Regiment obtained a large quantity of weapons and ammunition the enemy had abandoned or hid in its mopping sector.⁴⁵⁾

As for rifles, heavy machine guns, light machine guns and pistols, we have already referred to. The other spoils include two 15-centimeter guns with about 6,000 rounds, eight 20-centimeter guns with about 1,000 rounds, ten trench mortars with 57,218 rounds, 55,122 hand grenades, 2,022 Chinese broad swords, four tanks, 2,300 suits of plain clothes and so on. It is likely that a great majority of them were found not in the Safety Zone but in woods or on hills in this area.

In this connection, there are some who argue that, since such a large number of weapons and ammunition were discovered, the summary execution of the plainclothes soldiers hunted out in the Safety Zone can be justified, saying that the hiding of so many weapons shows their secret plan for a revolt.

However, there is a great deal of 'forcing things' in this argument. In the first place, it is not clear whether the enemy remnants simply abandoned those weapons and ammunition or they hid them with an eye to a revolt.

In the second place, it is impossible to specify the relationship between them and the hidden weapons, even admitting that some of them intentionally hid those weapons.

In the third place, it is impossible for them to gain access to those hidden weapons. It is still more impossible for them to use those weapons systematically.

Thus considered, the mere fact that so many weapons were detected in the mopping-up sector does not suffice to justify the summary execution of most of the enemy remnants hunted out in the Safety Zone.

<Sector F>

As mentioned before, the 66th Regiment captured more than 1,600 enemy officers and men on December 12 and 13. They were generally obedient and there was no sign of any trouble brewing. The enemy soldiers captured on the first day were interned and even supplied with food, but according to the battle report of the Regiment's 1st

⁴⁵⁾ NSS vol.I, p.524.

Battalion, a Regimental order was issued at 2 p.m. on the following day to execute all the prisoners in accordance with the Brigade order. Thus on the evening of that day, the 1st, 3rd and 4th Companies took out the prisoners from the internment camp, 50 at a time, and bayoneted them to death.⁴⁶⁾

The original of the above Regimental order has not yet been found, and some suspect that it was concocted by the 1st Battalion.⁴⁷⁾ However that may be, the fact remains that more than 1,600 prisoners of war were cruelly killed, and that for no good reason whatever. This is unquestionably a case which justifies more than enough the application of **both definitions of gyakusatsu**.

<Sector J>

Here we must again take up the treatment of the large number of prisoners captured near Mufu-shan Hill. As mentioned previously, Morozumi Gyosaku, the 65th Regiment Commander, says in his memoir that of about 15,300 Chinese taken captive near the hill (the number of captives was 14,777, according to *the Diary of Yamada Senji*), noncombatants were released and of the remaining 8,000 prisoners, almost half the number fled taking advantage of a fire. The Shanghai Expeditionary Force persistently ordered via Brigade Commander Yamada that prisoners should be executed, but determined to set them free, Morozumi ordered a battalion commander to send them across the Yangtze River. When, however, the battalion had just begun sending prisoners across the river, Morozumi's memoir says, a panic started among the prisoners awaiting their turn on this side the river, and to suppress the confusion, machine-gun fire was opened on them. A great majority of prisoners fled by land, while some others jumped into the river. But, Morozumi writes, the prisoners killed by Japanese gunfire was very small in number.

The question is of course how far Morozumi's account of the affair is true. What was the purpose of taking the prisoners to the bank of the Yangtze? Was it release or execution?

Unfortunately for the Japanese, there is hardly any evidence to back up what Morozumi says in his memoir. On the contrary, a number of soldiers belonging to the 65th Regiment recorded in their diaries a large-scale execution of over 15,000 prisoners.⁴⁸⁾ It is hardly possible to find in their diaries an entry of a confusion or a

⁴⁶⁾ Ibid., p.567.

⁴⁷⁾ This suspicion is touched upon in NS, pp.317-318 and discussed in detail by Itakura Yoshiaki, *Honto-wa-kodatta Nankin-jiken* [This was the Truth of the Nanking Incident](Tokyo, Nihon-Tosho-Kanko-kai, 1999), pp.123-129.

⁴⁸⁾ Ono Kenji et al, *Nankin-daigyakusatsu-o-kirokushita-Kogun-heishi-tachi* [Imperial Army Soldiers who recorded the Nanking Massacre](Tokyo, Otuski-shoten, 1996).

panic that Morozumi says forced the Japanese to kill the prisoners by gunfire.⁴⁹⁾ All I can say for the present is that the prisoners were in all likelihood taken to the bank to be executed, and executed they actually were. It is well known that the Yamada Brigade was seriously short of food for its soldiers and it is of course easy to understand that, being at a loss how to feed the prisoners, the 65 Regiment unwillingly chose to kill them. Whatever the reason, was there no other means than to kill them? It seems that this is also a case where **definitions 1 and 2** can safely be applied.

◇

So far we have seen how mopping-up operations were carried out in each of these sectors by the regiment responsible for it, but on December 21, 1937, dispositions of troops were changed and the guarding of the whole city and neighboring areas was left to the 16th Division's 30th Brigade under the command of major General Sasaki Toichi, and all the other units left the city of Nanking.

On December 24, investigation of the Chinese in the International Safety Zone started under Sasaki's command to sift out Chinese stragglers from peaceable citizens.

At the Tokyo trial, former Lieutenant-General Nakasawa Mitsuo, Chief of staff of the 16th Division at the time of the Nanking campaign, stated in his affidavit as follows.⁵⁰⁾

Therefore, being unable to trust that all the inhabitants in the refugees' area were peaceable citizens, the necessity of investigating the inhabitants of the area came about.

Thus, a Sino-Japanese Joint Commission was organized on Dec. 25th to investigate the inhabitants.

The method of investigation was to interrogate or inspect the Chinese one by one in the presence of both Japanese and Chinese and judge whether he was a straggler or not by consultation of the Japanese soldiers and the Chinese committees; for the general people, certificates of residence were issued. Those who were determined to be stragglers by these means were turned over to the Headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force. Accordingly, it is indeed not true that they were slaughtered.

Major General Sasaki's private record goes like this: ⁵¹⁾

pp.105,135,239,289,309.

⁴⁹⁾ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁾ IMTFE, p.32,625.

⁵¹⁾ NSS vol.I, p.276.

December 26 (1937)

I was appointed chairman of the pacification committee. The purpose of cleaning up the city was at once to detect and arrest enemy stragglers mingling with the inhabitants, thereby to frustrate the possible plot by disturbing elements, to ease the mind of the people by maintaining our military discipline, and thus to restore order and peace immediately. Through strict control and policing, I was able to attain this aim in about twenty days.

January 5 (1938)

Investigation work is over. Up to this day we have hunted out about 2,000 straggling soldiers within the walled city and interned them in the former Chinese Foreign Ministry building. We have also interned as prisoners of war wounded Chinese soldiers who were in the custody of foreign missionaries.

Straggling soldiers who were continuing disturbant activities in areas outside the walled city were arrested one by one, and the number of those executed at Hsiakwan has reached several thousand.

Enemy casualties in the capture of Nanking are estimated at about 70,000, while the strength of the Chinese garrison soldiers up to the day of the fall of Nanking is estimated to be about 100,000.

January 22

I handed over my duty as guarding commander to Major General Amaya Naojiro of the 11th Division, after which our division was transferred to North China.

These accounts seem to show that, during the period of December 24 to around January 15, wounded Chinese soldiers as well as Chinese stragglers hunted out within the walls were treated as prisoners of war, whose number was estimated to exceed 2,000.

On the other hand, enemy stragglers arrested while engaged in disturbant activities outside the walls were executed, whose number was several thousand.

How many Chinese prisoners of war were unlawfully killed? CHART 1 will show the approximate numbers of Chinese POWs unlawfully executed, of Chinese soldiers legitimately killed in battle and of Chinese surrenderers and wounded soldiers released or interned by the Japanese.

As we have shown each time, those numbers are based on Japanese battle reports, diaries, memoirs and other materials, and the numbers recorded or mentioned in such documents are, more often than not, exaggerated so as to simplify the accounts or, in some cases, to overemphasize military successes. Considering this, we might say that

the numbers, particularly those of the killed, given in the chart can possibly be too large but they can never be too small. Taking all this into consideration, it may be safe to conclude that, so far as those Japanese records can be drawn upon for our estimation, the maximum number of Chinese prisoners of war unlawfully killed by the Japanese army can hardly exceed 30,000.

Lastly, it may also be worth noticing that as many as 18,000 or more Chinese military captives were, not killed, but released or interned, and seeing that to release or intern enemy soldiers was nothing worth special mention in Japanese battle reports or war memoirs in those days, the above number, too, can hardly be an exaggerated one.